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Abstract
A Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol enables a user to retrieve a data item from a database while hiding
the identity of the item being retrieved; speciﬁcally, in a t-private k-server PIR protocol the database is replicated
among k servers, and the user’s privacy is protected from any collusion of up to t servers. The main cost-measure
of such protocols is the communication complexity of retrieving a single bit of data.
This work addresses the information-theoretic setting for PIR, where the user’s privacy should be unconditionally
protected against computationally unbounded servers.Wepresent a general construction,whose abstract components
can be instantiated to yield both old and new families of PIR protocols. A main ingredient in the new protocols is
a generalization of a solution by Babai, Gál, Kimmel, and Lokam for a communication complexity problem in the
multiparty simultaneous messages model.
Our protocols simplify and improve upon previous ones, and resolve some previous anomalies. In particular, we
get (1) 1-private k-server PIR protocols with O(k3n1/(2k−1)) communication bits, where n is the database size; (2)
t-private k-server protocols with O(n1/(2k−1)/t) communication bits, for any constant integers k > t1; and (3)
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t-private k-server protocols in which the user sendsO(log n) bits to each server and receivesO(nt/k+) bits in return,
for any constant integers k > t1 and constant > 0. The latter protocols have applications to the construction of
efﬁcient families of locally decodable codes over large alphabets and to PIR protocols with reduced work by the
servers.
© 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol allows a user to retrieve a data item of its choice from
a database, so that the server storing the database does not gain information about the identity of the
item being retrieved. For example, an investor might want to know the value of a speciﬁc stock without
revealing which stock she is interested in. This problem was introduced by Chor et al. [14], and has since
then attracted a considerable amount of attention. In formalizing the problem, it is convenient to model
the database by an n-bit string x, where the user, holding some retrieval index i, wishes to learn the ith
data bit xi . This default setting can be easily extended to handle more general scenarios, e.g., of larger
data items, several users, or several retrieved items per user.
A trivial solution to the PIRproblem is to send the entire database x to the user.However,while providing
perfect privacy, the communication complexity of this solution may be prohibitively large. Note that if the
privacy constraint is lifted, then an optimal solution to the retrieval problem is to have the user explicitly
send i to the server and receive xi in return. This non-private solution requires only log2 n + 1 bits
of communication, whereas the trivial private solution mentioned above requires n communication bits.
Thus, the most signiﬁcant goal of PIR-related research has been tominimize the communication overhead
imposed by the privacy constraint.
Unfortunately, if the server is not allowed to gain any information about the identity of the retrieved
bit, then the linear communication complexity of the trivial solution is optimal [14]. To overcome this
problem, Chor et al. [14] suggested that the user accesses k replicated copies of the database kept on
different servers, requiring that each individual server gets absolutely no information about i. PIR in this
setting is referred to as information-theoretic PIR. 4 The above default privacy requirement naturally
generalizes to t-private PIR, which keeps the index i private from any collusion of (at most) t out of the
k servers.
The best PIR protocols known prior to the current work 5 are summarized below (1) a 2-server pro-
tocol with O(n1/3) communication bits [14]; (2) a k-server protocol with O(n1/(2k−1)) communication
bits, for any constant k ([1] improving on [14]; see also [26]); (3) an O(log n)-server protocol with
O(log2 n log log n) communication bits ([14], and implicitly in Beaver and Feigenbaum [5] and Beaver
et al. [6]), and (4) an O(n1/k/t) bound for the more general case of t-private PIR [14]. All the above
protocols require only a single round of interaction, in which the user sends a query to each server and
receives an answer in return.
4 In principle, the term ‘information-theoretic PIR’may also refer to protocols which leak a negligible amount of information
about i. However, there is still no evidence that such a relaxation is useful.
5 Subsequent work will be addressed in Section 1.3.
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No strong general lower bounds for PIR are known.Mann [33] obtained a constant-factor improvement
over the trivial log2 n bound, for any ﬁxed k (the constant was improved in [38]). In the 2-server case,
much stronger lower bounds can be shown under various restrictions. Goldreich et al. [22] (generalizing
a lower bound from [14]), obtain strong lower bounds for linear PIR protocols, where the user’s query
is interpreted as asking for some linear combination of the database entries, under the assumption that
the user reads a constant number of bits from the answers it receives. Kerenidis and de Wolf [30] obtain
nearly tight lower bounds for general (nonlinear) 2-server PIR protocols in which the servers’ answers
contain a constant number of bits. Beigel et al. [7] obtain a tight lower bound for protocols in which the
servers’ answers contain one bit. Other lower bounds for restricted PIR protocols are given by Itoh [27].
Lower bounds for locally decodable codes, which are closely related to PIR (see Section 1.2), appear
in [29,16,34,30]. These results still leave an exponential gap between known upper bounds and lower
bounds for unrestricted PIR.
A different approach for reducing the communication complexity of PIR is to settle for computational
privacy, i.e., privacy against computationally bounded servers. Following a 2-server protocol by Chor and
Gilboa [13], Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [31] showed that in the computational setting one server sufﬁces.
Under a standard number theoretic intractability assumption (the quadratic-residuosity assumption), they
construct, for every constant  > 0, a single-server protocol with communication complexity of O(n)
bits. Generalizations of this protocol were given in [36,33]. Subsequently, Cachin et al. [12] constructed,
based on a new number theoretic intractability assumption, a single-server protocol with poly-logarithmic
communication.
From a practical point of view, single-server PIR protocols are preferable to multi-server ones for
obvious reasons: they avoid the need to maintain replicated copies of the database or to compromise
the user’s privacy against several colluding servers. Moreover, single-server protocols from the literature
obtain better asymptotic communication complexity than information-theoretic protocols with a constant
number of servers. However, for real-life parameters the known single-server protocols are typically less
efﬁcient than known multi-server (even 2-server) protocols, especially in terms of their computational
overhead. Furthermore, single-server protocols have some inherent limitations which can only be avoided
in a multi-server setting. For instance, it is impossible for a (sublinear-communication) single-server PIR
protocol to have very short queries (say,O(log n) bits long) sent from the user to the server, or very short
answers (say, one bit long) sent in return. These two extreme types of protocols, which can be realized in
the information-theoretic setting, have various applications [17,10]. Finally, the close relation between
information-theoretic PIR and locally decodable codes [29], discussed in Section 1.2, further motivates
the study of PIR in this setting.
1.1. Our results
Wepresent a uniﬁed general framework for the construction of PIR protocols, and instantiate its abstract
components to give three families of protocols.
Main family. Protocols from this family are based on a generalization of a multiparty communication
protocol by Babai et al. [3] in the so-called simultaneous messages model. They provide the following
improvements to the previous state of the art.
• 1-private k-server PIR with O(k3n1/(2k−1)) communication bits (compared to O(2k2n1/(2k−1)) in [1],
andO(k! n1/(2k−1)) in [26]). The polynomial dependence on k allows to get PIR with polylogarithmic
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communication, where for k = (log n/ log log n) the improvement over previous polylog-communi-
cation protocols from [14,6] is nearly quadratic. Similar improvements are obtained for the related
‘instance hiding’ problem [5,6].We note that even in the 2-server case, the communication complexity
of the protocol from [14] is improved by a constant factor.
• t-private k-server PIRwith communication complexityO(n1/(2k−1)/t), for every constant k. For t > 1,
this is a nearly quadratic improvement over the previous state of the art [14].
• Efﬁcient PIRwith logarithmic query length. Speciﬁcally, ourmain family can be used to obtain t-private
k-server PIR protocols withO(log n) query bits andO(nt/k+) answer bits, for every constant integers
k, t such that 1 t < k and constant  > 0. Protocols of this type (with t = 1) were used in [10] to
save computation in PIR via preprocessing, and have interesting applications, discussed in Section 1.2
below, to the construction of efﬁcient locally decodable codes over large alphabets.
Binary family. Protocols from this family are based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and polynomial
interpolation. This family generalizes protocols from [5,6,14,17], and allows t-private k-server PIR where
the user sends to each server a query of length O(k
t
log kn1/(k−1)/t) and receives a single bit in return
(hence the term binary). Protocols from this family are useful for obtaining: (1) binary locally decodable
codes (see Section 1.2); (2) efﬁcient PIR protocols for retrieving large records [14] or ‘streams’ of data;
(3) PIR protocols with an optimal amount of on-line communication (see [17]); and (4) PIR protocols
with a poly-logarithmic amount of on-line work by the servers (see [10]).
Probe-efﬁcient family. The probe complexity of a PIR protocol measures the number of bits from each
answer which are actually read by the user. Our third family of protocols utilizes a generalization of
the ‘combinatorial cubes’ geometry, ﬁrst used in [14], to obtain probe-efﬁcient PIR. Protocols from this
family have a very low (typically constant) probe complexity and a better communication complexity
than the protocols from the binary family. In contrast, protocols from the main family (for t > 1) require
the user to read all of the bits returned by the servers, but have a better communication complexity. 6
The probe complexity of PIR is an interesting complexity measure as it has several applications. First,
probe-efﬁcient protocols enable the user to be very efﬁcient in space: In all of our probe-efﬁcient protocols
the user’s algorithm requires onlyO(log n) space, whereas other protocols require the user to remember
either the queries sent to the servers or the randomness used to generate them. Second, probe-efﬁcient
PIR protocols allow the user to make use of another PIR protocol for retrieving only the bits that it needs
to read. 7 This feature may be useful for obtaining recursive information-theoretic PIR protocols [1,9]
and was used for obtaining time-efﬁcient computational PIR protocols via preprocessing [10]. Third, a
low probe complexity can be signiﬁcant in the context of the coding application discussed in Section 1.2.
Finally, the lower bounds proved in [22,38] are also phrased in terms of (and depend on) the probe
complexity.
Our main upper bounds on the complexity of PIR are summarized in Table 1.
6 In the case of 1-private PIR, protocols from the main family can typically achieve the same probe complexity and a slightly
better communication complexity.
7 Note that in order to effectively apply this idea in an information-theoretic setting, one must ensure that the answers in the
‘external’ protocol contain sufﬁcient replication. That is, at least two servers should know the answer, and an additional PIR
protocol is conducted where the database is this answer.
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Table 1
Summary of the main upper bounds in this paper
Family t Query length Answer length Probes Reference
1 O
(
k2n1/(2k−1)
)
O(kn1/(2k−1)) 2k − 1 Cor. 39
Main any O
(
k
t
(k
t
)
n1/(2k−1)/t
)
Cor. 35
1 Ok,(log n) Ok,(n1/k+) Ok,(n) Cor. 39
any Ok,(log n) Ok,(nt/k+) Cor. 36
Binary any O
(
k
t log kn
1/(k−1)/t) 1 Cor. 43
2 Ok(n1/(2k+1)/3) (2k + 1)/3 Cor. 46
Probe
efﬁcient 3 Ok(n1/2k/5) 2k/5 Cor. 46

√
k Ok(n
1/(k/t+1)) k/t + 1 Cor. 46
The query length is the maximal number of bits sent from the user to any single server, and the answer length is the maximal
number of bits sent in return. The term probes refers to the number of bits the user needs to read in each answer. The notation
Oy1,..,ys (·) indicates that y1, . . . , ys are treated as constants.
1.2. Locally decodable codes (LDC)
Much of the recent interest in information-theoretic PIR is due to its close relation with LDC. Standard
error-correcting codes can provide high fault tolerance while only moderately expanding the encoded
message. However, their decoding procedure requires to read the entire encoded message even if one is
only interested in decoding a single bit of this message. LDC simultaneously provide high fault tolerance
and a sublinear-time ‘local’ decoding procedure. To make this possible, the decoding procedure must
use randomness for selecting which bits to probe, and some error probability must be tolerated. More
formally, a code C : {0, 1}n → m is said to be (k, , )-locally decodable if every bit xi of x can be
decoded from y = C(x) with success probability1/2+  by reading k (randomly chosen) symbols of
y, even if up to a -fraction of the symbols in y were adversarially corrupted. By default, a k-query LDC
over  is a family of (k, (n), (n))-locally decodable codes Cn : {0, 1}n → m(n) such that (n), (n)
are lower bounded by some positive constant, independent of n.
Katz and Trevisan [29] have shown an intimate connection between LDC and information-theoretic
PIR. In particular, any 1-private k-server PIR protocol with query length (n) and answer length (n) can
be used to construct a k-query LDC of lengthO(2(n)) over  = {0, 1}(n). (If the query to each server is
uniformly distributed over its domain, as is the case for all of the protocols in this paper, the encoding of
a string x ∈ {0, 1} can be simply deﬁned to be the concatenation of the servers’ answers to all possible
queries.) This motivates the construction of PIR protocols with short queries. 8
8A relaxed notion of information-theoretic PIR (allowing some limited information leakage of i and some error probability) is
sufﬁcient for obtaining a corresponding LDC. However, to date there is no evidence that this type of relaxation can signiﬁcantly
help, as all known constructions of LDC directly correspond to known (perfect) PIR protocols.
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Our constructions of PIR protocols with logarithmic query length have an interesting interpretation
in terms of LDC. The main focus of the recent work on LDC [29,22,16,34,30] has been on ﬁnding the
minimal asymptotic length m(n) of a k-query LDC over a binary alphabet, or a constant size alphabet.
Generalizing a PIR lower bound of [33], it is proved in [29] that for any constant k the code length must
be super-linear. In the case of 2-query LDC, exponential lower bounds were obtained in [22] (for linear
codes) and [30] (for general codes). While no super-polynomial lower bounds are known for k > 2, the
best known upper bounds (obtained fromPIR protocolswith a single answer bit per server) are exponential
in n. This work has relevance to the following dual question: Suppose that we insist on the code being
efﬁcient, namely of polynomial length, but allow the alphabet  to grow with n. Then, how small can
(n) be? Our results imply the following nontrivial upper bound: for any constant  > 0 it sufﬁces to let
(n) = {0, 1}(n), where (n) = O(n1/k+).
1.3. Subsequent work
In a recent work, Beimel et al. [9] construct, for any ﬁxed k, a family of 1-private k-server PIR protocols
with O(n1/ck ) communication bits where ck = (k log k/ log log k). This is a signiﬁcant asymptotic
improvement over the best 1-private protocols presented in this work, for which ck = 2k − 1. The
construction of [9] uses a recursive composition of probe-efﬁcient protocols, which are based on (and in
a sense generalize) ones appearing in this work.
In another recent work, Woodruff and Yekhanin [39] constructed a t-private k-server protocol with
communication complexity O(k2
t
log kn1/(2k−1)/t), thus removing the
(
k
t
)
term compared to our pro-
tocols. Their protocol is an instance of our general construction, where they use Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme and a new simultaneous messages protocol.
A survey of results on PIR was recently written by Gasarch [18]; in particular, this survey contains
an updated list of articles in the ﬁeld. Survey papers containing results on locally decodable codes were
recently written by Trevisan [37] and by Goldreich [21].
Organization. In Section 2 we give an overview of our uniﬁed approach for constructing PIR protocols.
In Section 3 we provide some necessary deﬁnitions. In Section 4 we describe a meta-construction of PIR
protocols, in Section 5 we instantiate one of its crucial ingredients, and in Section 6 we derive new and
old families of PIR protocols as instances of the meta-construction. Finally, in Section 7 we present an
optimization of previous protocols.
2. Overview of techniques
At the heart of our constructions is a novel combination of two techniques. 9
2.1. Reduction to polynomial evaluation
The ﬁrst technique is a reduction of the retrieval problem to the problem of multivariate polynomial
evaluation. Speciﬁcally, the retrieval of xi , where the servers hold x and the user holds i, is reduced
to an evaluation of a multivariate polynomial px , held by the servers, on a point E(i), which the user
9A restricted use of this approach was made in [10].
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determines based on i. We refer to E(i) as the encoding of i. As observed in [6] and, more generally,
in [14], the degree of px can be decreased by increasing the length of the encoding E(i) (i.e., the
number of variables in px). Originating in [5], different variants of this reduction have been implicitly
or explicitly used in virtually every PIR-related construction. In fact, even the seemingly ‘combinatorial’
constructions from [14,1] can be cast in this terminology (see Section 6.3). It is interesting to note
that encodings realizing the optimal length-degree tradeoff, which were utilized in [14,17] to construct
special families of PIR protocols with short answer length, could not be used to realize the best-known
bounds on the total communication complexity. In [14,1] it seemed necessary to use a more redundant
encoding for obtaining the best protocols. This situation is remedied in the current work, where the most
communication-efﬁcient protocols are obtained using an optimal encoding. Consequently, we get at least
a constant-factor improvement to the communication complexity of all previous protocols, including in
the 2-server case.
2.2. Simultaneous messages protocols for polynomial evaluation
A main ingredient in our new protocols is a generalization of a solution by Babai et al. [3] to a
communication complexity problem of computing the generalized addressing function in the so-called
simultaneous messages (SM) model. Interestingly, this problem was motivated by circuit lower bounds
questions, completely unrelated to privacy or coding. Toward solving their problem, Babai et al. con-
sider the following scenario. A degree-d m-variate polynomial p is known to k players, and k points
y1, y2, . . . , yk (each being an m-tuple of ﬁeld elements) are distributed among the players such that
player j knows all points except yj . An external referee knows all k points yj but does not know p. How
efﬁciently can the value p(y1+y2+· · ·+yk) be communicated to the referee if the players are restricted
to simultaneously sending a single message (each) to the referee?
A naive solution to the above problem is to have one of the players send an entire description of
p to the referee. Knowing all points yj , the referee can then easily compute the required output. A key
observationmade in [3] is that it is in fact possible to domuch better. By decomposingp(y1+y2+· · ·+yk)
into monomials and assigning each monomial to a player having the least number of unknown values,
it is possible to write p(y1 + · · · + yk) as the sum of k lower degree polynomials in the inputs, each
known to one of the players. More precisely, each player j can locally compute from its inputs a degree-
d/k polynomial pj with its unknown inputs yj as indeterminates, such that p(y1 + · · · + yk) =
p1(y1)+p2(y2)+· · ·+pk(yk). Then, by letting each player j communicate the (much shorter) description
ofpj , the referee can compute the required output.The amount of savings obtainedby this degree reduction
technique depends on the values of the parameters m,d, and k. In [3,2], due to constraints imposed by
the speciﬁc problem they consider, the degree-reduction technique is applied with rather inconvenient
choices of parameters. Thus, in their setting the full savings potential of the technique has not been
realized. It turns out that in the PIR context, where there is more freedom in the choice of parameters,
the full spectrum of possible tradeoffs is revealed.
It is instructive to look at three useful choices of parameters: (1) If d = 2k− 1, then the degree of each
polynomial pj is only (2k − 1)/k = 1. When m >> d, this 2k − 1 savings factor in the degree makes
the description size of each pj roughly the (2k − 1)th root of the description size of p. (2) If d = k − 1,
the degree of each pj becomes 0, and consequently communicating each pj requires sending only a
single ﬁeld element. (3) Finally, if m >> d and d >> k, then the cost of communicating pj is roughly
the kth root of the cost of communicating p. These three examples, respectively, turn out to imply the
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existence of k-server PIR protocols with (1) both queries and answers of lengthO(n1/(2k−1)); (2) queries
of lengthO(n1/(k−1)) and answers of lengthO(1); (3) queries of lengthO(log n) and answers of length
O(n1/k+), for an arbitrarily small constant  > 0.
2.3. Combining the two techniques
In the case of 1-private PIR, the two techniques can be combined in the following natural way. On input
i, the user computes an encoding y = E(i) and the servers compute a degree-d polynomial px such that
xi = px(E(i)). To generate its queries, the user ‘secret-shares’E(i) among the servers by ﬁrst breaking
it into otherwise-random vectors y1, . . . , yk which add up to y, and then sending to each server Sj all
vectors except yj . Using the SM communication protocol described in the previous section, the servers
communicate xi = px(y) to the user.
This simple combination of the two techniques is already sufﬁcient to yield some of the improved
constructions. In the remainder of this work we generalize and improve the above solution in several
different ways. First, we abstract its crucial components and formulate a generic ‘meta-construction’
in these abstract terms. Second, we instantiate the abstract components to accommodate more general
scenarios, such as the one required for dealing with t-private PIR. Third, we try to optimize the probe
complexity of the above SM protocol, allowing the user to recover xi by reading just a few bits from
each answer. Finally, for both the 1-private and the t-private cases, we attempt at optimizing the amount
of replication in the setting of [3] while maintaining the quality of the solution (that is, we use a more
efﬁcient secret-sharing scheme for distributing E(i)). These generalizations motivate various extensions
of the SM communication model, which may be of independent interest.
3. Deﬁnitions
By [k] we denote the set {1, . . . , k}, and by ([k]
t
)
all subsets of [k] of size t. For a k-tuple v and a set
T ⊆ [k], let vT denote the restriction of v to its T-entries. That is, if T = {i1, . . . , it } and v = (v1, . . . , vk)
then vT = (vi1, . . . , vit ). By Yj for some j we represent a variable, while by the lower-case letter yj we
represent an assignment to the variable Yj . By H we denote the binary entropy function; that is,H(p) =
−p logp − (1− p) log(1− p), where in this paper all logarithms are taken to the base 2.
Polynomials. Let GF(q) denote the ﬁnite ﬁeld of q elements. By F [Y1, . . . , Ym] we denote the linear
space of all polynomials in the indeterminates Y1, . . . , Ym over a ﬁeld F, and by Fd [Y1, . . . , Ym] its
subspace consisting of all polynomials whose total degree is at most d, and whose degree in each indeter-
minate is at most |F | − 1. A natural basis for this linear space consists of all monic monomials satisfying
the above degree restriction. Restricting the degree to be at most |F |−1 guarantees that each polynomial
in Fd [Y1, . . . , Ym] represents a distinct function from Fm to F. It follows that the ‘syntactic dimension’of
Fd [Y1, . . . , Ym], which is equal to the number of distinct monic monomials, coincides with its ‘semantic
dimension’, the dimension of the subspace of F |F |m spanned by {(p(y))y∈Fm : p ∈ Fd [Y1, . . . , Ym]}.
The case F = GF(2) will be the most useful in this work. In this case, the natural basis consists of all
products of at most d distinct indeterminates. Hence, dim(Fd [Y1, . . . , Ym]) =∑dw=0 (mw) for F = GF(2).
We denote this dimension by (m, d). Formally,
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Notation 1. (m, d) def=∑dw=0 (mw).
We will also be interested in Fd [Y1, . . . , Ym] where |F | > d. In this case, the dimension of the space is(
m+d
d
)
.
3.1. PIR protocols
In this section we deﬁne 1-round information-theoretic PIR protocols. 10 A k-server PIR protocol
involves k servers S1, . . . ,Sk , each holding the same n-bit string x (the database), and a user U who
wants to retrieve a bit xi of the database.
Deﬁnition 2 (PIR). A k-server PIR protocol
P = (R,Q1, . . . ,Qk,A1, . . . ,Ak, C)
consists of a probability distributionR and three types of algorithms: query algorithmsQj (·, ·), answering
algorithms Aj (·, ·), and a reconstruction algorithm C. At the beginning of the protocol, the user picks a
random string r from the distributionR. For j = 1, . . . , k, it computes a query qj = Qj (i, r) and sends
it to server Sj . Each server Sj responds with an answer aj = Aj (qj , x) (we assume, without loss of
generality, that the servers are deterministic; otherwise, we can ﬁx their randomness arbitrarily. Hence,
the answer is a function of the query and the database). Finally, the user computes the bit xi by applying
the reconstruction algorithm C(i, r, a1, . . . , ak). A k-server protocol as above is a t-private PIR protocol,
if it satisﬁes the following requirements:
Correctness. The user always computes the correct value of xi . Formally, for every i ∈ [n], every
random string r, and every database x ∈ {0, 1}n,
C(i, r,A1(Q1(i, r), x), . . . ,Ak(Qk(i, r), x)) = xi.
t-Privacy. Each collusion of up to t servers has no information about the bit that the user tries to retrieve.
Formally, for every two indices i1, i2 ∈ [n] and for everyT ⊆ [k], of size |T | t , the distributionsQT (i1, ·)
and QT (i2, ·) are identical.
The communication complexity of a PIR protocol is the total number of bits communicated between
the user and the k servers, maximized over all choices of x, i and r. We will often separately measure the
query length and the answer length. We say that a PIR protocol has query length  and answer length 
if the user sends at most  bits to each server, and receives at most  bits from each server. Note that in
such a case, the communication complexity is at most k(+ ).
While the main complexity measure of PIR protocols is their communication complexity, we will
sometimes also be interested in their probe complexity, which measures the number of bits that the user
actually has to read from the servers’ answers. We say that the probe complexity of a PIR protocol is c
10 All the protocols constructed in this paper, as well as all previous information-theoretic PIR protocols, require a single round
of queries and answers. This deﬁnition may be extended to multi-round PIR in the natural way.
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if the user can compute its output by probing at most c bits from each answer aj (whose location may
depend on its input i and the choice of r).
3.2. Linear secret-sharing
A t-private secret-sharing scheme allows a dealer to distribute a secret s among k players, such that
any set of at most t players learns nothing about s from their joint shares, and any set of at least t + 1
players can completely recover s from their shares. A secret-sharing scheme is said to be linear over a
ﬁeld F if s ∈ F , and the share received by each player consists of one or more linear combinations of
the secret and u independently random ﬁeld-elements (where the same random ﬁeld-elements are used
for generating all shares). A linear secret-sharing scheme over a ﬁeld F is formally deﬁned by a k-tuple
L = (L1, . . . , Lk) such that each Lj is a linear mapping from F × Fu to F"j , where "j is the jth player
share length. 11 To share a secret s ∈ F , the dealer chooses a random r ∈ Fu with uniform distribution
and the share of the jth player is Lj(s, r) (the same r is used for all the parties). Finally, given a linear
secret-sharing scheme as above, to share a vector in Fm, the dealer independently shares each of its m
entries. We next deﬁne two examples of linear secret-sharing schemes that will be useful in the paper.
Deﬁnition 3 (Shamir’s scheme [35]). Let F = GF(q), where q > k, and let 1, . . . ,k be distinct non-
zero elements of F. To t-privately share a secret s ∈ F , the dealer chooses t random elements a1, . . . , at ,
which together with the secret s deﬁne a univariate polynomial p(Y ) def= atY t+at−1Y t−1+· · ·+a1Y + s.
Observe that p(0) = s. The share of the jth player is p(j ). This share is a linear combination of the
random inputs and the secret. Each set of at least t + 1 players can recover p(Y ) by interpolation, and
hence can also reconstruct s = p(0). On the other hand, every set of t players learns nothing about s from
their shares.
Deﬁnition 4 (The CNF scheme [25]). This scheme may be deﬁned over any ﬁnite ﬁeld (in fact, over any
ﬁnite group), and proceeds as follows. To t-privately share a secret s ∈ F :
• Additively share s into (k
t
)
pieces, each labeled by a different set from
([k]
t
)
; that is, s = ∑
T ∈([k]t ) rT ,
where the pieces rT are otherwise-random ﬁeld elements. (Equivalently, all rT except one may be
chosen uniformly at random, and the last is determined so that they all sum up to s.)
• Distribute to each player Pj all pieces rT such that j ∈ T .
The t-privacy of the above scheme follows from the fact that every t players miss exactly one piece rT
(namely, the one labeled by their index set). Every set of t + 1 players views all pieces, and can therefore
reconstruct the secret. The share of each party consists of
(
k−1
t
)
ﬁeld elements. Clearly, this scheme is
linear.
The CNF scheme has also been referred to as replication-based secret-sharing [20]. It may be viewed as
a special case of the formula-based secret-sharing construction from [11], obtained by using the canonical
conjunctive normal form (CNF) representation of the t-out-of-n threshold function (hence the name ‘CNF
scheme’). It is shown in [15] that shares from the CNF scheme can be locally converted (i.e., without
11 Recall that a mapping Lj : Fu+1 → F is linear if Lj (x + y) = Lj (x)+ Lj (y) for every x, y ∈ Fu+1.
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communication) to shares of the same secret from any other linear scheme realizing the same access
structure. In particular, shares from the t-private CNF scheme can be converted to shares from the t-
private Shamir scheme. Thus, in any PIR protocol that relies on Shamir’s scheme one could have also
used the CNF scheme, at the cost of introducing a
(
k
t
)
replication overhead (but without increasing the
asymptotic complexity in terms of n). The converse is not known to be true.
4. The Meta-construction
In this section we describe our construction in terms of its abstract general components, and specify
some useful instantiations for each of these components. In Section 5 several combinations of these
instantiations are used for obtaining different families of PIR protocols.
4.1. Building blocks
There are three parameters common to all of our constructions (1) a ﬁnite ﬁeld F, (2) a degree parameter
d, and (3) an encoding length parameter m. The database x is always viewed as a vector of n ﬁeld
elements. 12 Some variants of our construction use an additional segment length parameter ".
All variants of our construction (as well as previous PIR protocols) can be cast in terms of the following
abstract building blocks:
Linear space of polynomials. Let V ⊆ Fd [Y1, . . . , Ym] be a linear space of degree-d m-variate polyno-
mials such that dim(V )n. The three most useful special cases are:
V1: The space Fd [Y1, . . . , Ym] where F = GF(2); in this case, m and d must satisfy (m, d)n. We
will use the notation V1d,m whenever we want to emphasize the underlying parameters d and m.
V2: The space Fd [Y1, . . . , Ym] where |F | > d; in this case, m and d must satisfy
(
m+d
d
)
n. Again, we
use V2d,m to emphasize the parameters d and m.
V3: The linear subspace of Fd [Y1, . . . , Ym] such that F = GF(2) and V is spanned by the following
basis of monomials. Let " be an additional segment length parameter, and let m = "d. We label
the m indeterminate by Yg,h, where g ∈ [d] and h ∈ ["]. The basis of V will include all monic
monomials containing exactly one indeterminate from each segment, i.e., all monomials of the form
Y1,h1Y2,h2 · · ·Yd,hd . Since the number of such monomials is "d , the restriction on the parameters in
this case is "dn.
Low-degree encoding. A low-degree encoding (with respect to the polynomial space V) is a mapping
E : [n] → Fm satisfying the following requirement: There existm-variate polynomials p1, p2, . . . , pn ∈
V such that ∀i, j ∈ [n], the value pi(E(j)) is 1 if i = j and is 0 otherwise. By elementary linear algebra,
dim(V )n is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the existence of such an encoding. Given a low-
degree encoding E and polynomials p1, p2, . . . , pn as above, we will associate with each database x ∈
Fn the polynomial px ∈ V deﬁned by px(Y1, . . . , Ym) =∑ni=1 xipi(Y1, . . . , Ym). In the above x is ﬁxed,
12Whenever the ﬁeld F is chosen to be GF(2) then n is also the length of x in bits; otherwise, n might actually be smaller.
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and x1, . . . , xn serve as ﬁxed coefﬁcients (and not variables). Note that px(E(i)) = xi for every i ∈ [n]
and x ∈ Fn.
With each of the above linear spaces we associate a natural low-degree encoding. 13 Speciﬁcally, we
use:
E1: Let E1(i) be the ith vector in GF(2)m of Hamming weight at most d. A proof of validity of this
encoding, that is, the existence of appropriate polynomials p1, . . . , pn, appears in Appendix B.
E2: Let 0, . . . ,d be distinct ﬁeld elements. Then, E2(i) is the ith vector of the form (f1, . . . ,fm)
such that
∑m
j=1 fj d. A proof of the validity of this encoding may be found in Appendix B.
E3: Let (i1, . . . , id) be the d-digit base-" representation of i (that is, i =∑dj=1 ij "j−1). Then, E3(i) is a
concatenation of the length-" unit vectors ei1+1, ei2+1, . . . , eid+1. The validity of this encoding follows
by letting pi = Y1,i1+1 · · · · · Yd,id+1.
Linear secret-sharing scheme. Linear schemes will be denoted by L. The following t-private schemes
will be useful.
CNF : The k-player t-private CNF scheme from Deﬁnition 4.We will use the notation CNFk,t whenever
we want to emphasize the underlying parameters k and t.
Shamir : The k-player t-private Shamir scheme fromDeﬁnition 3.Again, we use Shamirk,t to emphasize
the parameters k and t.
OptCNF : A slight optimization of the CNF scheme, whose details will be discussed in Section 7.
The advantage of Shamir’s scheme is that its shares are shorter, resulting in PIR protocols with better
query complexity. On the other hand, the CNF scheme has extra redundancy making the task of designing
an SM protocol for them (as described in the next paragraph) easier.
Simultaneous messages communication protocol (abbreviated SM protocol). The fourth and most
crucial building block is a communication protocol for the following promise problem, which generalizes
the scenario described in Section 2.2 and is deﬁned by the instantiations of the previous components V
and L. The protocol, denoted P, involves a user U and k servers S1, . . . ,Sk .
• User’s inputs: Valid L-shares y1, . . . , yk of a point y ∈ Fm. (That is, the k vectors y1, . . . , yk can be
obtained by applying L to each entry of y, and collecting the shares of each player.)
• Servers’ inputs:All k servers hold a polynomial p ∈ V . In addition, each Sj holds the share vector yj .
• Communication pattern: Each server Sj sends a single message to U based on its inputs p, yj . We let
j denote a bound on the length of the message sent by Sj .
• Output: U should output p(y).
We will sometimes need to rely on the additional promise that y = E(i) for some i ∈ [n] and some given
encoding function E. In such cases, the input speciﬁcation for the SM protocol will include E as well.
13While the speciﬁc encoding being employed will usually not matter, in some cases it can make a difference. This is the case
for the protocols in Section 5.3. Also, note that the deﬁnition of encoding does not require that the computation of E(i) from i
and the computation of px from x can be done efﬁciently; nevertheless, the encodings used in this work all have this property.
This is important for making sure that we obtain computationally efﬁcient PIR protocols, a desired property of PIR protocols.
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We say that the probe complexity of an SM protocol is c if the user can compute its output by probing
at most c bits from each message (whose location may depend on its input, but not on the previous bits
it read from the message).
In Section 5 we will present several SM protocols, corresponding to different choices of polynomial
space V, secret-sharing scheme L, and encoding E.
4.2. Putting the pieces together
A 4-tuple (V ,E,L, P ) instantiating the above 4 primitives uniquely deﬁnes a PIR protocol PIR(V ,E,
L, P ). The protocol proceeds as follows.
• U lets y = E(i) (where y ∈ Fm).
• U shares y according to L among the k servers. Let yj denote the vector of shares received by Sj .
• Each server Sj lets p = px (as determined by the encoding E), and sends a message to U as speciﬁed
by protocol P on inputs (p, yj ).
• U reconstructs xi = p(y) by applying the output computation function speciﬁed in P to y1, . . . , yk
and the k messages it received.
The following lemma summarizes some easily veriﬁable properties of the above protocol.
Lemma 5. PIR(V ,E,L, P ) is a t-private k-server PIR protocol, in which the user sends m"j ﬁeld
elements to each server Sj and receives j bits in return (where "j is the share size deﬁned by L and j is
the length of message sent by Sj in P).Moreover, the probe complexity of PIR(V ,E,L, P ) is the same
as that of P.
Note that the only information that a server gets is a share of the encoding E(i); the t-privacy of the
secret-sharing scheme ensures that any collusion of t servers learns nothing about i from their shares. For
the query complexity, recall that y = E(i) ∈ Fm and that the user shares each of the m coordinates of y
independently. Thus, the share size of server Sj is indeed m"j , where "j is the share size deﬁned by L
for sharing one coordinate (ﬁeld element).
Remark 6. Some perspective concerning a typical choice of parameters is in place.We will usually view
k (the number of servers) and t (the privacy threshold) as being constants, and the encoding length m (or
n on which it depends) as the main complexity parameter. In such a setting each share size "j is also
constant, and so the query complexity of PIR(V ,E,L, P ) is O(m). If d is constant then, for any of the
three vector spacesV1,V2,V3, lettingm = O(n1/d) sufﬁces to meet the dimension requirements. Thus,
in the typical case where d, t, k are all constants, the length of the queries in PIR(V ,E,L, P ) isO(n1/d)
and the length of the answers is determined by P.
Remark 7. In principle, the SM component in our construction could be replaced by a more general
interactive protocol. However, there is yet no evidence that such an additional interaction may be helpful.
Moreover, in deﬁning an interactive variant of the fourth primitive one would have to take special care
that the privacy requirement is not violated by the interaction. In the current non-interactive framework,
the privacy property is guaranteed by the mere use of a t-private secret-sharing scheme.
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Remark 8. For the privacy of the PIR protocol, it is sufﬁcient to use a t-private ‘distribution scheme’
instead of a secret sharing scheme, where a t-private distribution scheme guarantees that every set of at
most t players cannot reconstruct the secret, however sets of size t + 1 might not be able to reconstruct
the secret. For example, the PIR protocols based on the balancing technique of [14] do not secret-share
E(i). While distribution schemes are more general than secret sharing schemes, it turns out that, for all
the protocols we describe in this paper, secret-sharing schemes are sufﬁcient.
5. Simultaneous messages protocols
In this section we describe SM protocols corresponding to most useful combinations of V, L, and E.
In Section 6 we will turn them into PIR protocols by choosing appropriate parameters. Some additional
protocols are postponed to Section 7.
5.1. Protocol P1: SM protocol for main PIR family
Protocol P1will be used to obtain our main family of PIR protocols (see Section 6.1). It may be viewed
as a natural generalization of the protocol from [3]. The inputs for P1 are deﬁned by the polynomial space
V1 = Fd [Y1, . . . , Ym], where F = GF(2), and the secret-sharing scheme CNF.
Lemma 9. For V = V1d,m and L = CNFk,t , there exists an SM protocol P1 with message length
j = (m, dt/k)
(
k−1
t−1
)dt/k
.
Proof. Let y = ∑
T ∈([k]t ) yT be an additive sharing of y ∈ {0, 1}
m induced by the CNF scheme, such
that the input yj of Sj is (yT )j /∈T . The servers’ goal is to communicate p(y) = p(∑T yT ) to U .
Let Y˜ = (YT,b)T ∈([k]t ),b∈[m]. Each variableYT,b corresponds to the input bit (yT )b, whose value is known
to all servers Sj such that j ∈ T . Deﬁne a
(
k
t
)
m-variate polynomial q(Y˜ ) def= p (∑T YT,1, . . . ,∑T YT,m).
Note that q has the same degree as p, and q((yT ,b)T ∈([k]t ),b∈[m]) = p(y). We consider the explicit
representation of q as the sum of monomials, and argue that for every monomial YT1,b1YT2,b2 . . . YTd′ ,bd′
of degree d ′d there exists some j ∈ [k] such that at most dt/k variables YT,b with j ∈ T appear
in the monomial. Indeed, consider the multiset T1 ∪ T2 ∪ · · · ∪ Td ′ . Since this multiset contains d ′tdt
elements, there must be some j ∈ [k] that occurs at most dt/k times. We partition the monomials of q
into k polynomials q1, . . . , qk such that qj contains only monomials in which the number of the variables
YT,b with j ∈ T is at most dt/k, and each monomial of q is in exactly one polynomial qj . Therefore
q(Y˜ ) =∑kj=1 qj (Y˜ ).
We are now ready to describe the protocol P1. Denote by Y¯ j the set of variables whose values are
unknown to the server Sj , that is,
Y¯ j = (YT,b)T ∈([k]t ),j∈T ,b∈[m]
and by y¯j the corresponding values. Each Sj substitutes the values yj of the variables it knows in qj to
obtain a polynomial qˆj (Y¯ j ). The message of server Sj is a description of qˆj . The user, who knows the
assignments to all variables, reconstructs p(y) by computing
∑k
j=1 qˆj (y¯j ) = q((yT )T ∈([k]t )) = p(y).
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Communication complexity. Recall that qˆj is a degree-dt/k multivariate polynomial with m
(
k−1
t−1
)
variables. By the deﬁnition of q, not all monomials are possible: no monomial contains two variables
YT1,b and YT2,b for some b ∈ [m] and T1 = T2. Thus, to describe a possible monomial of qˆj we need,
for some w ∈ {0, . . . , dt/k}, to choose w indices in [m] and w sets of size t that contain j. Therefore,
the number of possible monomials of qˆj is at most
∑dt/k
w=0
(
m
w
)(
k−1
t−1
)w(m, dt/k)(k−1
t−1
)dt/k
. Since
each coefﬁcient is from GF(2), the length of each message is as promised. 
Remark 10. Todeﬁne the protocolP1 precisely, one should specify a concrete partition of the polynomial
q into the polynomials q1, . . . , qk (in particular, an assignment for the monomials that can be assigned to
more than one polynomial). More generally, instead of partitioning the monomials, one may break q to
any k polynomials which add up to q and satisfy the requirement utilized above. Such a generalization
will be used in Section 5.3.1. However, for the purpose of Lemma 9, any partition of the monomials as
described above is sufﬁcient.
Remark 11. An important question is whether the communication complexity of the protocol P1 is
optimal. By extending a lower bound argument from [3] it is possible to show that, indeed, protocol P1 is
essentially optimal [24]. This is true even when given the additional promise that y is a valid E1-encoding
of some i ∈ [n].
5.1.1. Reducing the probe complexity of P1 for t = 1
Protocol P1 requires the user to read all of the received bits. Next, we show that when t = 1 and given
the promise that y is a legal encoding, i.e. y = E1(i) for some i ∈ [n], then it is possible to modify P1 so
that the user needs to read much fewer bits. This is done without changing the communication complexity
of the protocol.
Lemma 12. For V = V1d,m, E = E1, and L = CNFk,1, there exists an SM protocol P1′ with message
length (m, d/k) and probe complexity (d, d/k).
Proof. Let y = y1+· · ·+yk be an additive sharing of y = E1(i) (where y ∈ {0, 1}m), such that the input
of each server Sj includes all pieces yh with h = j . Similarly to Protocol P1, we let each Sj compute
a degree-d/k polynomial qˆj (Yj ), such that∑kj=1 qˆj (yj ) = p(y). The key observation is that when
t = 1, each value qˆj (yj ) can also be expressed as the value of a degree-d/k polynomial q ′j (Y ), known
to Sj , on the point y (rather than on yj ): the polynomial q ′j is deﬁned as q ′j (Y ) = qˆj (Y −
∑
h =j yh).
We can now rely on the promise that the Hamming weight of y is at most d to reduce the probe
complexity. Similarly to P1, each server Sj expresses q ′j (Y ) as a sum of monomials, and sends to the
user the (m, d/k) coefﬁcients (a single bit each). To evaluate q ′j (y), the user only needs to read the
coefﬁcients of those monomials whose variables correspond to non-zero entries of y. Since y has at most
d non-zero entries and the degree q ′ is at most d/k, there are at most(d, d/k)monomials involving
the corresponding variables, and thus the probe complexity is as promised. 
The case d = 2k − 1 is the most useful one for constructing efﬁcient 1-private PIR protocols. In this
case, the probe complexity of P1′ is (d, d/k) = d+1; in the next lemma we describe an SM protocol
P1′′, which has probe complexity d, that is, one bit less than P1′.
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Lemma 13. Suppose that d is odd and d/k = 1. Then, for V = V1d,m, E = E1, and L = CNFk,1,
there exists an SM protocol P1′′ with message length (m, d/k) = m+ 1 and probe complexity d.
Proof. Protocol P1′′ will proceed similarly to P1′ with the followingmodiﬁcation: in the message sent by
Sj , the bit representing the free coefﬁcient of q ′j is added (modulo 2) to each of the m other coefﬁcients.
The user, holding a point y ∈ GF(2)m of Hamming weight d ′d, can evaluate q ′j (y) as follows. If d ′ is
odd, then q ′j (y) is equal to the exclusive-or of the d ′ modiﬁed coefﬁcients whose positions correspond to
the nonzero entries of y. If d ′ is even (hence d ′ < d) then the user takes the exclusive-or of the same d ′
bits as above together with the free coefﬁcient. In each of the two cases, the user reads at most d bits as
required. 
5.2. Protocol P2: SM protocol for binary PIR
ProtocolP2 is useful for the construction of efﬁcient PIR protocols with short answers (see Section 6.2).
Unlike protocol P1, which can be used with any combination of the parameters k, d, t , the applicability
of P2 is restricted to the case k > dt . That is, k = dt +1 is the minimal sufﬁcient number of servers. The
ﬁrst part of the following lemma is implicit in [5,6,14] and a special case of the second part is implicit
in [17,19].
Lemma 14. For V = V2d,m and L = Shamirk,t , and assuming that k > dt and |F | > k, there exists
an SM protocol P2 in which each server sends a single element of F. Moreover, given the promise that
p(y) ∈ F ′ for some subﬁeld F ′ of F, it sufﬁces for each server to send a single element of F ′.
Proof. Recall that in the deﬁnition of Shamir’s scheme, a ﬁeld element s is shared by evaluating a degree-t
polynomial, whose free coefﬁcient is s, on k distinct non-zero points j , 1jk. Thus, in the setting of
P2 the user holds m univariate degree-t polynomials q1, . . . , qm such that y = (q1(0), . . . , qm(0)), and
yj = (q1(j ), . . . , qm(j )) for j ∈ [k]. All servers hold a degree-d m-variate polynomial p(Y ) over F,
and each server Sj holds the share yj of y. The goal of the servers is to communicate the value p(y) to
U using a single element of F per server, or a single element of F ′ given the promise that p(y) ∈ F ′.
We ﬁrst describe the protocol in which each server sends a single element ofF. In this case, the message
sent by Sj in Protocol P2 is mj = p(yj ). Note that the points (j , mj ) lie on the graph of the degree-dt
univariate polynomial q(Z) def= p(q1(Z), . . . , qm(Z)), and that q(0) = p(y). Since k > dt , the user
can reconstruct q(Z) by interpolation and evaluate q(0) = p(y). Speciﬁcally, there exist interpolation
coefﬁcients c1, . . . , ck such that p(y) can be reconstructed from the messages m1, . . . , mk by applying
the ﬁxed linear combination
∑
cjmj .
We now describe how to reduce the messages to be elements of a subﬁeld F ′ given the promise that
p(y) ∈ F ′. Suppose ﬁrst that each server modiﬁes its message to m′j = cjmj . Then, U may reconstruct
p(y) by adding the kmessagesm′j it receives. As our ﬁnal step, we use a ﬁeld homomorphismH : F →
F ′ such that H() =  for all  ∈ F ′. (Since H is a homomorphism, for any a, b ∈ F it holds that
H(a+ b) = H(a)+H(b).) Now, instead of sendingm′j , the jth server will send the F ′-elementH(m′j ).
From the properties of H and from the promise that p(y) ∈ F ′ we may conclude that by adding the k
answers (over F ′) the correct value p(y) is obtained. 
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A special case of interest is when F ′ = GF(2) and F is a sufﬁciently large extension ﬁeld of F ′. In this
case, each message in the SM protocol consists of a single bit. Note that when k > dt the messages in
Protocol P1 are also one-bit long. However, for this choice of parameters P2 is superior to P1 as it relies
on the (ideal) Shamir secret-sharing scheme, whereas P1 relies on the highly redundant CNF scheme.
Thus, in the PIR protocol constructed from P2 the query length is shorter.
Woodruff and Yekhanin [39], in a subsequent work, describe an SM protocol for V = V2d,m and
L = Shamirk,t for the case where k > dt/2. This protocol eliminates the
(
k
t
)
factors in our t-private
constructions.
5.3. Protocol P3: SM protocol for probe-efﬁcient PIR
Similarly to protocols P1′ and P1′′, the aim of protocol P3 is to minimize the probe complexity while
maintaining a low communication complexity. The inputs for P3 are deﬁned by V = V3, E = E3, and
L = CNF. A special case of this protocol is implicit in the 2-server PIR protocol from [14].
Another similarity between P3 to P1′ and P1′′ is that its version for the case t = 1 does not smoothly
generalize to larger values of t. However, in contrast to the latter two protocols, we will use the special
structure of the E3 encoding to obtain some useful generalizations of P3 for the case t > 1. 14
We will ﬁrst focus on the simpler case where t = 1 and later address the general case.
Lemma 15. For V = V3d,m, E = E3, and L = CNFk,1, there exists an SM protocol P3 with message
length "d/k
(
d
d/k
)
and probe complexity
(
d
d/k
)
.
Proof. We ﬁrst explicitly specify the inputs to the protocol. Let p be a polynomial in V3d,m, and let
y ∈ {0, 1}"d be an encoding of some index i under the E3 encoding, that is, y = w1◦ · · · ◦wd , where ◦
denotes concatenation and eachwh is some unit vector from the space F". (By default we let F = GF(2),
but the following discussion may apply to an arbitrary ﬁnite ﬁeld.) Furthermore, let wh = ∑ka=1wa,h
be an additive sharing of wh induced by the 1-private CNF scheme. We will refer to each "-tuple wa,h
as a piece of wh. The input yj of Sj is (wa,h : a ∈ [k] \ {j}, h ∈ [d]). The servers’ goal is to efﬁciently
communicate p(y) to the user such that the user will need to read only
(
d
d/k
)
bits from each message.
Recall that p ∈ V3d,m, i.e., each of its monomials contains exactly one variable from each of the d
segments. It can therefore be viewed as a multi-linear function of d vectors in F". We can thus write:
p(y)=p(w1◦ · · · ◦wd)
=p
((
k∑
a=1
wa,1
)
◦ · · · ◦
(
k∑
a=1
wa,d
))
=
∑
a1∈[k],...,ad∈[k]
p(wa1,1◦ · · · ◦wad,d). (1)
14 In fact, one can construct a similar protocol based on the encoding E1 (rather than E3) whose probe complexity and
communication complexity are inferior to those of the protocol presented below only by poly-logarithmic factors. Informally
speaking, this is done by ‘covering’E1 using a poly-logarithmic number of copies of E3 and using the solution for E3 described
below.
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Each expression p(wa1,1◦ · · · ◦wad,d) in sum (1) will be referred to as a term, and will be denoted from
now on by the d-tuple (a1, . . . , ad). Notice that each term evaluates to a single ﬁeld element (a single bit
by default). Moreover, the user’s goal of learning p(y)may now be reduced to learning the sum of all kd
terms.
Each term contains d segments and each segment is missed by one server. Thus, if k > d then every
term can be evaluated by at least one server. In this case, we partition the responsibility for evaluating the
kd terms among the servers, where each server Sj is only responsible for evaluating terms (a1, . . . , ad)
such that ah = j for h = 1, . . . , d. Each server sums the values of the terms it is responsible for and
sends a single bit to the user.
If kd, then, similarly to ProtocolP1, we partition the responsibility for evaluating the kd terms among
the servers, where each server Sj is only responsible for evaluating terms (a1, . . . , ad) such that ah = j
for at most d/k indices h. Server Sj , missing at most d/k pieces in each of the terms assigned to
it, tries to guess them in a clever way. This is done using the knowledge that each wh is promised to be
a unit vector. Therefore, wj,h = ei −∑a∈[k]\{j}wa,h for some unit vector ei ∈ {0, 1}", and hence Sj
can compute a list of " possible values (corresponding to the " unit vectors) for each missing piece wj,h.
This already implies a protocol where each server sends kd"d/k bits: There are kd terms that need to
be evaluated. For each such term (a1, . . . , ad), the server that is responsible for it evaluates p using the
pieces that it knows and each of the guesses for the pieces it does know; there are at most "d/k such
guesses. The server sends this list of guesses to the user. The user, who knows the values of all pieces,
can compute the true value of each term.
We next optimize this protocol. Instead of sending a list of length "d/k for each of the kd terms,
each server sends only
(
d
d/k
)
lists, one for each set A ∈ ( [d]d/k). This is done by assigning each term
(a1, . . . , ad)which is under the responsibility of Sj to some setA ∈
( [d]
d/k
)
such that {h : ah = j} ⊆ A.
Now, each of the "d/k possible guesses of (wah,h)h∈A allows Sj to uniquely determine all terms which
are assigned to A, and therefore also their sum. Thus, Sj can send, for each of the "d/k guesses and each
set A, a single bit containing this sum. Finally, note that the user needs to read only one bit from each list
(corresponding to the correct guess), giving a total of ( dd/k) probed bits per server. 
5.3.1. Probe-efﬁcient protocols with t > 1
Towards handling arbitrary values of t, we will ﬁrst attempt at a straightforward generalization of the
previous approach.As before, let y=w1◦ · · · ◦wd , where eachwh is some unit vector from F". Denote the
pieces (i.e., additive shares) ofwh bywT,h, where T ∈
([k]
t
)
. Recall that each server Sj receives all pieces
wT,h such that j ∈ T . Generalizing Eq. (1), the servers’ goal is to efﬁciently communicate to the user
p(w1◦ · · · ◦wd)=p



 ∑
T ∈([k]t )
wT,1

 ◦ · · · ◦

 ∑
T ∈([k]t )
wT,d




=
∑
(T1,...,Td )∈([k]t )
d
p(wT1,1◦wT2,2◦ · · · ◦wTd,d).
Again, each expressionp(wT1,1◦wT2,2◦ · · · ◦wTd,d) in the last sumwill be referred to as a term, and denoted
by the d-tuple of sets (T1, . . . , Td). The user’s goal of learning p(w1◦ · · · ◦wd) may now be reduced to
learning the sum of all
(
k
t
)d
terms.
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As before, we try to assign each of the terms to a server which can come upwith a short list of candidates
for its value.We previously relied on the fact that a server could come up with a list of " candidate values
for each missing piece. However, this is not possible in general. Indeed, in the t-private CNF scheme
with t > 1, a server Sj misses more than one piece of each secret wh. It is thus no longer possible to
compute the value of a missing piece even when given a correct guess for the value of the shared unit
vector wh.
We therefore take a somewhat different approach. Since we cannot require a server to guess the value
of an unknown piece wTh,h, we will try to directly utilize the promise that the sum
∑
T ∈([k]t ) wT,h is a
length-" unit vector, and can thus be efﬁciently guessed. Note that for any server Sj , this sum involves
both known and unknown pieces. Moreover, if j ∈ Th′ for each h′ ∈ [d] \ {h} (so that Sj holds all pieces
wTh′ ,h′) then Sj can easily obtain a list of " candidates for the value of the sum of terms∑
T ∈([k]t )
(T1, . . . , Th−1, T , Th+1, . . . , Td)
=
∑
T ∈([k]t )
p(wT1,1◦ · · · ◦wTh−1,h−1◦wT,h◦wTh+1,h+1◦ · · · ◦wTd,d).
We will refer to such a sum as a block and denote it by
(T1, . . . , Th−1, ∗, Th+1, . . . , Td)
(where the wild-card symbol ‘*’ represents summation over all (k
t
)
pieces). This notion will be later made
more general andmore precise, but for the time being a block should be thought of as a linear combination
of terms which can be efﬁciently communicated with a low probe complexity.
We now consider the vector space over F whose elements are all possible linear combination of terms.
(Here and in the following, terms should be treated by default as syntactic objects which form the standard
basis of the vector space of their linear combinations.) Note that the dimension of this space is (k
t
)d
and
both the blocks and the sum of all terms are vectors in this space. The key observation is that if the set of
available blocks happens to span the sum of all terms, then the user can learn the correct output from the
values of the blocks. When F = GF(2), the above spanning property is equivalent to the existence of a
set of blocks in which each term occurs an odd number of times.
In the following we formalize the above discussion and obtain necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for
the spanning property to hold. We start by deﬁning a more general class of blocks.
Deﬁnition 16. Let 0d be an integer, h1, h2, . . . , hd− be distinct indices from [d], and S1, . . . , Sd−
∈ ([k]
t
)
be d− setswhose union does not cover [k]. The -block deﬁned byh1, . . . , hd− andS1, . . . , Sd−
is the sum of all terms (T1, . . . , Td) such that Thj = Sj for j = 1, . . . , d−. Such a block will be denoted
by a d-tuple whose d −  entries h1, . . . hd− contain (respectively) the sets S1, . . . , Sd−, and whose
remaining  entries contain the wild-card symbol ‘*’.
Note that a -block is a summation of
([k]
t
)
terms, whose names lie in some -dimensional subspace
of the d-dimensional space
([k]
t
)d
of term names. However, not every d-tuple made of sets and wild-card
symbols represents a valid block. Some examples follow.
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Example 17. For k = 4, d = 3, and t = 2, the triplet ({2, 4}, {2, 4}, {1, 2}) is a valid 0-block, the triplet
({2, 4}, ∗, {1, 2}) is a valid 1-block, and ({3, 4}, ∗, ∗) is a valid 2-block. However, ({2, 4}, {3, 4}, {1, 2})
and ({2, 4}, ∗, {1, 3}) are not valid blocks, since their sets cover [k].
We now deﬁne two useful notions related to the expressive power of a set of blocks in a given term
space. For convenience, we identify each block with the set of terms it involves.
Deﬁnition 18. Fix t, d, k. Let T ⊆ ([k]
t
)d be a set of terms and B be a set of blocks.We say that B covers
T , if any term  ∈ T is included in some block from B. We say that B spans the sum of terms in T (or
spans T for short), if there exists a linear combination of the blocks in B resulting in the sum∑∈T 
(where each block is viewed as a linear combination, with coefﬁcients from F, of terms from the entire
space).
Using the above terminology, the protocol of Lemma 15 utilized the fact that every term was spanned
by the set of 0-blocks and 1-blocks held by some server.
Remark 19 (On the role of the ﬁeld F). Notice that whether or not a given set of blocks spans a given set
of terms may depend on the underlying ﬁeld F. For instance, if there exists a set of blocks such that every
term is covered by exactly 4 blocks from this set, then the sum of all terms is clearly spanned over GF(3),
but is not necessarily spanned over GF(2). Nevertheless, we use F = GF(2) throughout this section since
this is sufﬁcient (and at one point necessary) for our upper bounds.
We now generalize the protocol of Lemma 15 to use a general spanning condition.
Lemma 20. Fix k, d, t and an integer 0 < d, and let B be the set of all ′-blocks with 0′.
Suppose thatB spans the sumof all terms inT =
([k]
t
)d
.Then, forV = V3d,m,E = E3,andL = CNFk,t ,
there exists an SM protocol P3 with message length "
(
d

)
and probe complexity
(
d

)
.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 15. However, while there we tried to span each term
separately, here we will directly span the sum of all terms.
The protocol proceeds as follows. Each ′-block b ∈ B is assigned to some server whose index does
not occur in any of the d − ′ sets of b. The block b is further assigned to some set A ∈ ([d] ) which
contains all of the wild-card coordinates of b. Let Bj,A denote the set of all blocks in B assigned to Sj
and A.
The message sent by each server Sj consists of
(
d

)
lists, one for each set A ∈ ([d] ). The list for the
set A = {h1, . . . , h} contains " ﬁeld elements, each corresponding to a different choice of length-"
unit vectors for the wild-cards in coordinate set A. Speciﬁcally, suppose that h1 < h2 < · · · < h. For
each ′-block b ∈ Bj,A and each position (i1, . . . , i) of the list, server Sj evaluates p on the pieces
speciﬁed in the block, where each wild-card in position ha is replaced by the unit vector eia . This deﬁnes
a separate list of length " for each block b ∈ Bj,A. (Note that when ′ < , the list will contain duplicate
entries.) Let Lj,A,b denote this list. As a ﬁnal optimization, all the lists Lj,A,b are linearly combined to
the single list Lj,A =∑b∈Bj,A cbLj,A,b where∑b∈B cbb is some ﬁxed linear combination of the blocks
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in B which gives the sum of all terms. (The existence of such a linear combination is guaranteed by the
spanning premise.) The message sent by each server Sj will consist of all lists Lj,A, giving the promised
message length.
Finally, the user, holding i = (i1, . . . , id) ∈ ["]d , can compute p(E(i)) as the sum
k∑
j=1
∑
A = {h1, . . . , h}
h1 < h2 < · · · < h
(Lj,A)(ih1 , ih2 , ..., ih )
.
This requires probing one bit from each of the
(
d

)
lists in each message. 
To make use of Lemma 20, one should study the relation that the various parameters must satisfy in
order for the spanning condition to hold.We will restrict our attention from now on to the case  = 1, and
will view the parameters k, d, t as constants. The importance of this case is that it provides ‘balanced’PIR
protocols, in which the length of the queries is roughly the same as that of the answers. 15 This motivates
the study of the following question:
Question 21. Given d and t, how large should k be so that the set B1 of 0-blocks and 1-blocks spans the
sum of all terms?
In the remainder of this section we will solely focus on this question. First, we introduce some notation.
Deﬁnition 22. Let kc(d, t) denote the smallest integer k such that the term space
([k]
t
)d is covered by its
0-blocks and 1-blocks, 16 and ks(d, t) denote the smallest k such that the sum of all terms is spanned by
these blocks.
An exact characterization of kc(d, t) and some simple bounds on ks(d, t) are given by the following
two claims.
Claim 23. For any positive integers d and t, kc(d, t) is the smallest integer greater than dt/2. That is,
kc(d, t) = dt/2 + 1.
Proof. We show that the term space
([k]
t
)d is covered by 1-blocks if and only if k > dt/2. If dt2k,
then it is possible to construct a term  = (T1, T2, . . . , Td) such that each element j ∈ [k] occurs in at
least two sets Th (e.g., by greedily adding each element to a pair of vacant sets) and such a term cannot
be covered by a 1-block. Conversely, if there exists a term  = (T1, T2, . . . , Td) which is not covered by
any 1-block, then every element j ∈ [k] must occur in at least two sets Th, implying that dt2k. 
15When applying Lemma 20 with  > 1, the communication complexity of the SM protocol is at least quadratic in ", whereas
the length of the inputs (or PIR queries) is linear in ".
16 Since each 0-block is covered by (exactly d) 1-blocks, it is sufﬁcient in the deﬁnition of kc to consider 1-blocks.
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Claim 24. For any positive integers d and t, and over any ﬁeld F,
kc(d, t)ks(d, t)dt + 1.
Proof. The fact that kc is a lower bound on ks is an immediate consequence of the deﬁnitions. The upper
bound on ks(d, t) follows from the fact that the 0-blocks alone are sufﬁcient to cover the entire term
space, and hence to span the sum of all terms, whenever k > dt . 
The protocol of Lemma 15 shows the lower bound on ks , provided by Claim 24, is tight for the case
t = 1. However, this is not the case in general (see Appendix C). In the following we will improve the
upper bound on ks(d, t) for t > 1. A ﬁrst observation to make is that, in addition to the 0-blocks, there
are other singleton sets of terms which can be spanned.
Lemma 25. If a term  = (T1, T2, . . . , Td) includes a set Th which is disjoint from all d − 1 other sets,
then {} is spanned.
Proof. Let  = (T1, T2, . . . , Td) be such a term, with Th satisfying Th ∩ Th′ = ∅ for any h′ ∈ [d] \ {h}.
The deﬁnition of valid blocks implies that:
• (T1, . . . , Th−1, ∗, Th+1, . . . , Td) denotes a valid 1-block (since the d − 1 sets in this d-tuple do not
include any element of Th, and thus cannot cover [k]); and
• For any T ∈ ([k]
t
) \ {Th}, the d-tuple
(T1, . . . , Th−1, T , Th+1, . . . , Td)
denotes a valid 0-block (since Th \ T = ∅ and each element of Th \ T is not covered by the d sets).
Finally, writing  as:
 = (T1, . . . , Th−1, ∗, Th+1, . . . , Td)−
∑
T ∈([k]t )\{Th}
(T1, . . . , Th−1, T , Th+1, . . . , Td),
the lemma follows. 
We can now focus our attention on the terms which we do not know how to handle directly.
Deﬁnition 26. A term (T1, T2, . . . , Td) is said to be bad, if it is not a 0-block, and it does not include a
set Tj disjoint from all others.
Lemma 27. Suppose that a term set T containing all bad terms (and possibly some other terms) can be
spanned. Then the set of all terms can be spanned.
Proof. The 0-blocks and the terms handled by Lemma 25 (replaced by their spanning sets of blocks)
span
([k]
t
)d \ T . 
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We are now ready to prove upper bounds on ks(d, t). The ﬁrst bound applies only to an odd d. The
second bound is slightly weaker, but can be applied also when d is even.
Lemma 28. For any positive integer t1 and odd integer d3,
ks(d, t) min (dt − (d + t − 3)/2 , dt − t) .
Proof. It sufﬁces to show that when d is odd, and when either k > dt − d+t−12 or k > dt − t − 1, then
the sum of all terms is spanned. Suppose k, d and t meet the above constraints. By Lemma 27, it sufﬁces
to show that some term set T containing all bad terms can be spanned.We now show that this is achieved
by the block set B which includes all 1-blocks in which the element ‘1’ occurs an even number of times.
Lemma 29. For k, d, t constrained as above, each bad term is included in an odd number of blocks from
the set B.
Proof. Suppose that this is not the case; that is, there exists a bad term  = (T1, . . . , Td)which is covered
by an even number of blocks from B. Now, consider the number of occurrences of ‘1’ in . We continue
with some observations that will help us prove the claim.
• If ‘1’ does not occur at all, then  is not bad, contradicting the assumptions.
• If ‘1’ occurs exactly once, in the set Th, then there is exactly one block from B covering . Speciﬁcally,
the block obtained by ‘removing’ Th (i.e., replacing it with a wild-card) contains an even number of
1’s (namely, 0 times), and it is a valid 1-block since its sets do not contain ‘1’. We conclude that this
case as well contradicts the assumptions.
• If ‘1’ occurs e times, where e is even: there are (d − e) candidates for blocks in B covering , namely
all those obtained by removing a set which does not contain ‘1’. Since d is odd and e is even, d − e is
odd. It follows that for  to be covered by an even number of blocks from B, at least one of the d − e
candidates must not be a valid 1-block, implying that some set Tz which does not contain ‘1’ must be
covered by all other sets.
• If ‘1’ occurs o times, where o is odd and is greater than 1, then there are o candidates for blocks in B
covering , namely all those obtained by removing a set which contains ‘1’. Again, it follows that for 
to be covered by an even number of blocks from B at least one of these candidates must not be a valid
1-block, implying that at least one of the (at least three) sets Tz which contain ‘1’ must be covered by
all other sets.
We deduce from the above cases that there must exist sets Tz, Tp1 and Tp2 , with distinct indices z, p1, p2,
such that: (a) Tz is covered by the union of all other d − 1 sets; and (b) 1 ∈ Tp1 ∩ Tp2 . Moreover, since 
is bad, we have: (c) every set Th intersects some other set; and (d) the union of all d sets is [k].
Now, what is the maximal k such that the above four conditions can be simultaneously satisﬁed by
some term ? Equivalently, what is the maximum size of the union of d sets T1, . . . , Td of size t each,
such that conditions (a),(b), and (c) above are met? Denote this maximum union size by k∗odd(d, t). The
following two propositions bound k∗odd(d, t) from above.
Proposition 30. k∗odd(d, t)dt − t − 1.
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Proof. For any sets T1, . . . , Td meeting the above conditions (a) and (b), we have:∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
h∈[d]
Th
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
h∈[d]\{z}
Th
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 (d − 1)t − 1
= dt − t − 1,
where the ﬁrst equality follows from condition (a) and the inequality from condition (b). 
Proposition 31. k∗odd(d, t)dt − d+t−12 .
Proof. Suppose that T1, . . . , Td meet the above conditions (a) and (c). For eachw ∈ Tz, let hw be an index
of some set other than Tz which includes w (where the indices hw need not be distinct, and their existence
is guaranteed by condition (a)). Let Z = {z} ∪ {hw : w ∈ Tz}. Next, for every h ∈ [d] \ Z, we select an
element yh which occurs both in Th and in some other set (again, the yh need not be distinct, and their
existence is guaranteed by condition (c)). Finally, we group the sets with indices from [d] \Z according
to their selected yh. That is, for each w ∈ [k] we deﬁne a ‘cluster’Gw def= {h ∈ [d] \ Z : yh = w}.
We analyze how the union size grows, when we ﬁrst take all sets with indices from Z, then add each
clusterGw containing two or more sets, and ﬁnally add all clustersGw containing a single set. The union
of all sets from Z is no larger than t |Z|− t , since each element of Tz is counted there at least twice.When
adding a clusterGw with at least two sets, its |Gw| sets contribute atmost t |Gw|−(|Gw|−1)(t− 12 )|Gw|
new elements to the union size. Finally, we add together all singleton clusters Gw. Suppose there are s
of them. Then, their total contribution to the union size is no larger than (t − 1)s, since the element yh
in each such unmatched set Th either occurs in a previously added set, or occurs in some other singleton
cluster (and will only be accounted for once). Altogether, we have that:∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
h∈[d]
Th
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 
∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
h∈Z
Th
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
h∈[d]\Z
Th
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 (t |Z| − t)+ (t − 1/2)(d − |Z|)
= dt − t + (|Z| − d)/2
 dt − t + (t + 1− d)/2
= dt − (d + t − 1)/2,
as required. 
We remark that the above analysis is tight; that is, k∗odd can be shown to be equal to
min(dt − t − 1, ⌊dt − d+t−12 ⌋).
It may now be concluded that when d is odd and k > k∗odd(d, t), no bad term can be covered by an
even number of blocks from B; combining this with Propositions 30 and 31, Lemma 29 follows. 
Proof of Lemma 28. (conclusion) Since all linear combinations are taken over F = GF(2), Lemma 29
implies that a set containing all bad terms can be spanned, which by Lemma 27 concludes the proof of
Lemma 28. 
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We now prove a slightly weaker bound on ks(d, t), which applies to any d and over any ﬁeldF (although
only an even d and F = GF(2) will be useful for our purpose). In fact, when d t + 2 this bound is
identical to the previous one, and otherwise the difference between the bounds is 1.
Lemma 32. For any positive integers d, t ,
ks(d, t) min (dt − (d + t − 3)/2 , dt − t + 1) .
Proof. The proof goes along the lines of the proof of Lemma 28. Again, we deﬁne a set of blocks B, and
show that it is guaranteed to span some set containing all bad blocks whenever k is no smaller than the
bound of Lemma 32. In this case, we let B be the set of all valid 1-blocks of the form (∗, T2, . . . , Td).
Clearly, every term can be covered by at most one block from B. We show that every bad term is covered
by exactly one block from B.
Suppose that  = (T1, . . . , Td) is a bad term not covered by B. It follows that the set T1 is covered by
the union of the other sets, implying that condition (a) from the proof of Lemma 28 holds with h = 1.
Since  is assumed to be bad, conditions (c) and (d) apply as well. Deﬁning k∗even analogously to k∗odd, the
proof of Proposition 31 can be used to show that k∗even(d, t)dt − d+t−12 (since only conditions (a),(c)
and (d) are used in this proof). Finally, k∗even(d, t)dt− t , since for any sets T1, . . . , Td meeting condition
(a) we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
h∈[d]
Th
∣∣∣∣∣∣=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
h∈[d]\{1}
Th
∣∣∣∣∣∣  dt − t. 
Substituting the bounds from Lemmas 28 and 32 in Lemma 20, we conclude the following:
Corollary 33. Suppose that k, d, t satisfy
k min (dt − (d + t − 3)/2 , dt − t + 1− (d mod 2)).
Then, for V = V3d,m, E = E3, and L = CNFk,t , there exists an SM protocol P3 with message length
d" and probe complexity d.
6. Families of PIR protocols
In this section we derive several explicit families of PIR protocols from the meta-construction.
6.1. Main PIR family
Our main family of PIR protocols uses V1, E1, CNF, and P1, P1′, or P1′′. Protocols from this family
yield our main improvements over previous upper bounds.We start with the general result, which follows
from Lemmas 5 and 9, and then consider some interesting special cases.
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Theorem 34. Letm and d be positive integers such that(m, d)n.Then, for any k, t such that 1 t < k,
there exists a t-private k-server PIR protocol with query length
(
k−1
t
)
m (per server) and answer length
(m, dt/k)
(
k − 1
t − 1
)dt/k
(per server).
Proof. The condition (m, d)n is sufﬁcient (and necessary) to guarantee the existence of an encod-
ing E1 as required. We use the CNFk,t secret-sharing scheme and thus the length of each share is(
k−1
t
)
m. Finally, we use the SM protocol P1. By Lemma 9, the length of the message of each server is
(m, dt/k)(k−1
t−1
)dt/k
. 
The total communication is optimized by letting d = (2k − 1)/t and m = (n1/d). Substituting
these parameters into Theorem 34 and using the approximation of , described in Appendix A, we get
the following explicit bounds.
Corollary 35. For any 1 t < k there exist:
(1) A t-private k-server PIR protocol with communication complexity
O
(
k2
t
(
k
t
)
n1/(2k−1)/t
)
.
(2) A 1-private k-server PIR protocol with communication complexity
k2((2k − 1)!n)1/(2k−1) + k + k3 = O
(
k3n1/(2k−1)
)
.
(3) A 1-private 2-server PIR protocol with communication complexity
4(6n)1/3 + 2 ≈ 7.27n1/3.
Proof. The ﬁrst bound is obtained from Theorem 34 by letting m = O(dn1/d) and d = (2k − 1)/t.
The second is obtained by letting m = ((2k− 1)! n)1/(2k−1) + k and d = 2k− 1, and the third by letting
m = (6n)1/3 and d = 3. 
Another interesting case, discussed and used in [10], is when the queries are of lengthO(log n). Such
protocols are obtained by letting d = m, where 0 < 1/2 is some constant.
Corollary 36. For any constant integers t, k (where 1 t < k) and constant  > 0, there exists a t-
private k-server protocol with query length O(log n) and answer length O(nt/k+). More precisely, for
any 0 < 1/2 there is a protocol with query length
(
k−1
t
)
(1/H() + o(1)) log n and answer length
n(H(t/k)+
t
k
log (k−1t−1))/H()+o(1)
.
Proof. The corollary follows by substitutingm = (1/H()+ o(1)) log n and d = m in Theorem 34,
and relying on the facts that lim→0 H(t/k)H() = t/k and lim→0 H() = 0. 
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As discussed in Section 1.2, a 1-private k-server PIR protocol with query length  and answer length
 gives rise to a k-query LDC of length k · 2 over the alphabet  = {0, 1}. If  = O(log n), then the
code length is polynomial. By substituting t = 1 in Corollary 36 we get:
Corollary 37. For any constant integer k2 and constant  > 0, there is a polynomial-length k-query
LDC over (n) = {0, 1}(n), where (n) = O(n1/k+).
In the case t = 1, protocols P1′ and P1′′ can be used to obtain probe-efﬁcient variants of Theorem 34.
Theorem 38. Let m and d be positive integers such that (m, d)n. Then, for any k there exists a
1-private k-server PIR protocol with query length (k − 1)m, answer length (m, d/k), and probe
complexity (d, d/k). Furthermore, if d is odd and d/k = 1 then the probe complexity can be
reduced to d.
Proof. Same as the proof of Theorem 34, where P1 is replaced by P1′ (see Lemma 12) or by P1′′ (see
Lemma 13). 
As special cases, we get the following probe-efﬁcient variants of Corollaries 35 and 36.
Corollary 39. For any positive integer k there exist:
(1) A 1-private k-server protocol with communication complexity
O(k3n1/(2k−1))
and probe complexity 2k − 1.
(2) A 1-private 2-server protocol with communication complexity 4(6n)1/3 + 2 ≈ 7.27n1/3 and probe
complexity 3.
(3) A 1-private k-server protocol with query length O(log n), answer length O(n1/k+), and probe
complexity O(n), for any constant  > 0. More precisely, for any  > 0 there is a protocol with
query length (k − 1)(1/H()+ o(1)) log n, answer length nH(/k)/H()+o(1), and probe complexity
nH(1/k)/H()+o(1).
Proof. Similarly to the proofs of Corollaries 35 and 36, the ﬁrst bound is obtained from Theorem 38 by
letting d = 2k − 1 and m = O(dn1/d) (in which case d is odd and d/k = 1), the second by letting
m = (6n)1/3 and d = 3, and the third by letting m = (1/H()+ o(1)) log n and d = m. 
Remark 40. In the protocols of Corollary 39 the user computes xi by taking the exclusive-or of a subset
of the answer bits, whose identity only depends on i. Moreover, the jth element of this subset can be
computed from the description of i in O(log n) space. Consequently, these protocols can be executed
even by a log-space bounded user who cannot afford to store the queries or the random input r that was
used to generate them.
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6.2. Binary PIR family
We obtain binary PIR protocols, in which each server sends a one-bit answer, by usingV2,E2, Shamir,
and P2 (the term binary PIR refers to the binary answers).
Theorem 41 (Implicit in [17]). Let m and d be positive integers such that (m+d
d
)
n. Then, for any t1,
there exists a t-private PIR protocol with k = dt + 1 servers, query length log(k + 1)m, and answer
length 1.
Proof. Such a PIR protocol is obtained by letting E = E2, V = V2d,m, L = Shamirk,t , and P = P2,
where F is GF(2log(k+1)) – the smallest extension of GF(2)with at least k+1 elements, and the subﬁeld
F ′ used by P2 is GF(2). 
Corollary 42. For any d, t1 there is a t-private PIR protocol with k = dt + 1 servers, query length
O(d log kn1/d), and answer length 1.
Rephrasing the above corollary we get,
Corollary 43. For any k, t1 there is a t-private k-server PIR protocol with query length
O
(
k
t
log kn1/(k−1)/t
)
,
and answer length 1.
6.3. Probe-efﬁcient PIR family
Our last family of protocols relies on V3, E3, CNF, and P3 as building blocks. These protocols have
the interpretation of utilizing the ‘combinatorial cubes’ geometry which was ﬁrst used in [14]. In fact,
they strictly generalize the 2-server protocol from [14]. The main advantage of the current family over the
main family is that it provides probe-efﬁcient protocols even in the case t > 1. It also slightly improves
the probe complexity in the case t = 1. However, the communication complexity of protocols from this
family is inferior to that of the main family, especially when t > 1.
We start with the case t = 1.
Theorem 44. Let d and " be positive integers such that "dn. Then, for any k2 there exists a 1-private
k-server PIR protocol with query length (k − 1)d", answer length "d/k( dd/k), and probe complexity(
d
d/k
)
.
Proof. The condition "dn guarantees the existence of an encoding E3 as required.We use the 1-private
CNF secret-sharing scheme, thus the query length is (k − 1)d". Finally, we use P3 as the SM protocol.
Therefore, by Lemma 15, the answer length and the probe complexity are as promised. 
For general values of t, we get the following protocols.
A. Beimel et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 71 (2005) 213–247 241
Theorem 45. Let d, ", t be positive integers such that "dn. Then, for
k = min (dt − (d + t − 3)/2 , dt − t + 1− (d mod 2))
there exists a t-private k-server PIR protocol with query length
(
k−1
t
)
d", answer length d", and probe
complexity d.
Proof. The condition "dn guarantees the existence of the encoding E3. The speciﬁed query length
is induced by the use of the t-private CNF secret-sharing scheme. Finally, by Corollary 33, the answer
length and the probe complexity are as promised. 
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 45 we get:
Corollary 46. Fix any positive integers d, t . For
k = min (dt − (d + t − 3)/2 , dt − t + 1− (d mod 2))
there exists a t-private k-server PIR protocol with communication complexity Od,t (n1/d) and probe
complexity d.
The smallest interesting instance of Corollary 46 is a 2-private 4-server protocol with communication
complexity O(n1/3) and probe complexity 3. In comparison to the corresponding protocol of the main
family (see Theorem 34), the communication complexity of this protocol is worse by a small constant
factor, but its probe complexity is much better (the probe complexity of the 2-private 4-server protocol
of Theorem 34 is O(n1/3)).
7. Optimized CNF secret-sharing
The families of PIR protocols, described so far, use two secret-sharing schemes: Shamir’s scheme
and the CNF scheme. Shamir’s scheme has the smallest shares possible—the size of each share is the
maximum between the secret size and the logarithm of the number of players [28]. In contrast, the size of
each share in the CNF scheme is
(
k−1
t
)
times the size of the secret. In some sense, the CNF sharing gives
more redundancy to the share holders. Our main family of protocols (described in Section 6.1) and the
protocols with small probe complexity (described in Section 6.3) exploit this redundancy to improve the
communication complexity compared to the protocols of [14]. This raises the question whether we can
maintain the improved communication complexity without paying the penalty of the redundancy, i.e.,
with shorter queries. This penalty can be quite big in the t-private protocols.
We demonstrate that some savings are possible. Speciﬁcally, we construct a secret-sharing scheme
OptCNF, whose share complexity improves on that of the CNF scheme by roughly a factor of t+1 when
k $ t ; yet, an SM protocol with identical communication complexity to that of P1 (and signiﬁcantly
better time complexity) can be based on OptCNF. This results in a similar improvement to the query
length of our main family.An additional feature of the optimized construction is a signiﬁcant reduction in
the computation required by the servers. For instance, in the 1-private case its dependence on k is reduced
from k2k−1 to roughly k!. We start with 1-private protocols and later discuss the t private case.
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Deﬁnition 47 (1-private optimized CNF scheme). To 1-privately share a secret s ∈ F :
• Additively share s into k pieces r1, . . . , rk; that is, s = ∑ki=1 ri , where the pieces ri are otherwise-
random ﬁeld elements.
• Deﬁne zi =∑kj=i+1 rj .• Distribute to each player Pj the pieces r1, . . . , rj−1, zj .
The 1-privacy of the above scheme follows from the fact that each share contains no more information
than the share of the same party in the secret-sharing scheme CNFk,1. On the other hand, every pair of
parties, say Pj1, Pj2 where j1 < j2, can reconstruct the secret s by computing
∑j1
j=1 rj + zj1 (all the rj ’s
in the sum, in particular rj1 , are held by Pj2). The total share size summed over all parties in this scheme
is (k+ 2)(k− 1)/2 ﬁeld elements. Asymptotically, this improves the total share size by a factor of 2 with
respect to CNFk,1, where the total share size is k(k − 1) ﬁeld elements.
Lemma 48. For the linear space V = V1d,m and the 1-private optimized CNF sharing OptCNF, there
exists a simultaneous message protocol P4 with message length (m, d/k).
Proof. We present an SM protocol P4 as required. The description uses the notation of Protocol P1
presented in the proof of Lemma 9; we consider only the case where t = 1, and denote Y{j},b by Yj,b.
In Protocol P1 the servers hold an m-variate polynomial p, which deﬁnes a km-variate polynomial q.
The monomials of q are partitioned to k polynomials q1, . . . , qk such that qj contains only monomials
in which the number of the variables Yj,1, . . . , Yj,m in each monomial is at most d/k. As discussed
in Remark 10, in P1 we did not specify the exact partition, that is, how to assign monomials that could
be assigned to more than one polynomial qj . For our next construction it is essential to require that a
monomial is assigned to the polynomial qj , where j is the smallest index such that the number of the
variables Yj,1, . . . , Yj,m in the monomial is at most d/k.
Fix any j and consider the server Sj . In Protocol P1 server Sj substitutes the values of the variables
that it knows in qj to obtain the polynomial qˆj
def= q(y1,1, . . . , yj−1,m, Yj,1, . . . Yj,m, yj+1,1, . . . , yk,m).
We claim that the new shares ofOptCNF sufﬁce for Sj to compute his original answer. Recall that every
monomial in q is multi-linear, and furthermore, if a variable Yj," appears in some monomial of q then
for every j ′ = j the variable Yj ′," does not appear in that monomial. We deﬁne an equivalence relation
between multi-linear monomials over the variables Y1,1, . . . , Y1,m, . . . , Yk,1, . . . , Yk,m. (For every j we
deﬁne a different equivalence relation.) We say that two monomialsM1 andM2 are in the relation if:
(1) For every " ∈ [m] and h ∈ {1, . . . , j} the variable Yh," appears inM1 if and only if it appears inM2,
and
(2) For every " ∈ [m], there is some index h1 ∈ {j + 1, . . . , k} such that the variable Yh1," appears in
M1 if and only if there is some h2 ∈ {j + 1, . . . , k} such that the variable Yh2," appears inM2, and
(3) For every h ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} the monomial M1 contains more than d/k variables from the set
Yh,1, . . . , Yh,m. (By Item (1) this is also true forM2.)
Also, if the condition in Item (3) does not hold for two monomials then they are in the relation. Notice
that if a monomial M is assigned to qj then all the monomials in its equivalent class appear in q and are
assigned to qj . By themulti-linearity, the sumof themonomials in each equivalence class can be expressed
as a new monomial is the variables Y1,1, . . . , Y1,m, . . . , Yj,1, . . . , Yj,m and new variables Zj,1, . . . , Zj,m
where Zj,"
def= ∑kh=j+1 Yh,". Furthermore, the polynomial qj is the sum of the new monomials. By the
A. Beimel et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 71 (2005) 213–247 243
deﬁnition ofOptCNF, server Sj knows the values zj,1, . . . , zj,m to be assigned to Zj,1, . . . , Zj,m. Thus,
Sj can compute the coefﬁcients of qˆj and send them to the user as in Protocol P1. 
We can generalize the optimized CNF scheme for arbitrary privacy thresholds. We only describe the
secret-sharing scheme; the details of the appropriate SM protocol are the same as in the above described
Protocol P4.
Deﬁnition 49 (The t-private optimized CNF scheme). To share a secret s ∈ F t-privately:
• Additively share s into (k
t
)
pieces, each labeled by a different set from
([k]
t
)
; that is, s = ∑
T ∈([k]t ) rT ,
where the pieces rT are otherwise-random ﬁeld elements.
• For every j ∈ [k] and every A ⊆ [j − 1] such that |A| t and |A| t + j − k deﬁne
zj,A =
∑
T :j /∈T , T∩[j−1]=A
rT .
• Distribute to each player Pj all pieces zj,A such that A ⊆ [j − 1] such that |A| t and |A| t + j − k.
The t-privacy of the above scheme follows from the t-privacy of the basic CNFk,t scheme. (While not
necessary for our purposes, it can also be veriﬁed that any set C ⊆ [k] such that |C| > t can reconstruct
the secret.)When k $ t , this scheme improves the total share size by a factor of t+1 compared toCNF.
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Appendix A. Approximations of (m, d)
For various calculations, we need to give bounds on(m, d). For an integer d, we can use the following
approximation:
(m, d) >
(m− d)d
d! . (A.1)
In particular, for (m, d)n to hold, it is sufﬁcient to let m = (d!n)1/d + d = ddn1/d + d, where d is
a constant depending on d. It holds that 3 = (6)1/3/3 ≈ 0.61, 5 = (120)1/5/5 ≈ 0.52, and d < 0.5
for d7 (by the Stirling approximation, limd→∞ d = 1/e).
If d = m for some constant 0.5 we will use the following approximation.
2(H()−o(1))m(m, m)2H()m (A.2)
(cf. [32, Theorem 1.4.5]). In particular, for (m, m)n to hold, it is sufﬁcient to let m = (1/H()+
o(1)) log n.
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Appendix B. Low-degree encoding
In this section we prove the validity of the low-degree encodings E1 and E2 deﬁned in Section 4.1. For
each of these encodings, we need to show the existence of degree-d polynomials pi such that pi(E(j))
is 1 if i = j and is zero otherwise.
Claim B.1. The encoding E1 is valid.
Proof. Recall the deﬁnition of E1. For n distinct vectors v1, . . . , vn in GF(2)m with Hamming weight
at most d, we deﬁne E1(i) = vi . Assume, without loss of generality, that the weights of these vectors
is monotonic non-increasing; i.e., if j < i then the weight of vj is greater or equal to the weight of vi .
Denote by Si the subset of [m] containing the positions in which vi is 1. We deﬁne the polynomials pi
one after the other, starting with p1 and ending at pn: Let
pi(Y1, . . . , Ym)
def=
∏
h∈Si
Yh −
∑
j :Si⊂Sj
pj (Y1, . . . , Ym). (B.1)
If Si ⊂ Sj then the weight of vj is greater than the weight of vi and thus all the polynomials on the
right-hand side of (B.1) are already deﬁned. Clearly, the degree of the polynomials pi is at most d.
We prove by induction on i that pi(vj ) equals 1 iff i = j . First, by the induction hypothesis, pi(vi)
= ∏h∈Si vih −∑j :Si⊂Sj pj (vi) = 1 − 0 = 1. Second, if j = i then pi(vj ) = ∏h∈Si vjh if Si ⊂ Sj
and pi(vj ) = ∏h∈Si vjh − pj (vj ) otherwise (again, by the induction hypothesis). In both cases, pi(vj )= 0. 
The proof of the validity of E2 for ﬁelds with a prime number of elements can be found in [17,
Lemma 6]. We (slightly) generalize it to any ﬁeld.
Claim B.2. The encoding E2 is valid.
Proof. Recall the deﬁnition ofE2. Let0, . . . ,d be distinct elements from some ﬁeld F. Then,E2(i) is
the ith vector of the form (f i1 , . . . ,f im) such that
∑m
"=1 f i" d. First, deﬁne the following polynomials
ri (the deﬁnition of the polynomials pi uses these polynomials).
ri(Y1, . . . , Ym)
def=
m∏
"=1
f i"−1∏
h=0
Y" − h
f i"
− h . (B.2)
The degree of ri is
∑m
"=1 f i" d.
If
∑m
"=1 f i" = d then we deﬁne pi def= ri . Indeed, ri(E2(i)) = 1. On the other hand, for every j = i it
holds that
∑m
"=1 f
j
" d =
∑m
"=1 f i" . Thus, there is at least one " such that f
j
" < f
i
" and ri(E2(j)) = 0.
For the general case, where
∑m
"=1 f i" d, assume, without loss of generality, that if j < i, then∑m
"=1 f i" 
∑m
"=1 f
j
" . Let
pi(Y1, . . . , Ym)
def= ri(Y1, . . . , Ym)−
i−1∑
j=1
pj (Y1, . . . , Ym)ri(E2(j)). (B.3)
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Clearly, the degree of the polynomials pi is at most degree d. By induction on i and the arguments for
the case
∑m
"=1 f i" = d, it follows that pi(vj ) equals 1 iff i = j . 
Appendix C. A lower bound on ks
In this section we present a tight lower bound on ks(d, t) for the case d = 3. The most signiﬁcant
implication of this bound is a strong separation between the cover bound kc and the span bound ks over
any ﬁeld F.
Claim C.1. For any t > 1, and over any ﬁeld F,
ks(3, t)2t.
Proof. We show that with k = 2t − 1 the sum of all terms is not spanned. For this, we deﬁne a set of
terms and show that every linear combination of 0-blocks and 1-blocks misses at least one term.
First we deﬁne a ‘cycle’ of sets
A− B0 − C0 − B1 − C1 − · · · − Bt−2 − Ct−2 − A.
This is a cycle of odd length (2t − 1), each edge of which represents a pair of sets which we would
like to cover [k]. Deﬁne the sets in this cycle as follows: each set will be taken to include t (cyclically)
consecutive elements, where the ‘ﬁrst’ element in each set is the last element in the previous one. (Notice
that the number of sets in the cycle sufﬁces exactly for the ﬁrst set to be consecutive to the last one.)
For instance, for t = 5 and k = 2t − 1 = 9 the sets will be: A = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, B0 = {5, 6, 7, 8, 9},
C0 = {9, 1, 2, 3, 4}, B1 = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, C1 = {8, 9, 1, 2, 3}, B2 = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, C2 = {7, 8, 9, 1, 2},
B3 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, C3 = {6, 7, 8, 9, 1}. Next, we construct the following list of 2t − 3 terms:
(A,B0, C0)
(A,B1, C0)
(A,B1, C1)
(A,B2, C1)
(A,B2, C2)
...
(A, Bt−2, Ct−3)
(A,Bt−2, Ct−2)
From the way that the sets and the terms were constructed it follows that:
• None of the terms in the above list is a 0-block (since Bj ∪ Cj = Bj ∪ Cj−1 = [k]).
• Any 1-block either covers no term, or covers two consecutive terms in the list (since there is no 1-block
of the form (∗, B, C) that covers any of the above terms and each 1-block of the form (A,Bj , ∗) or
(A, ∗, Cj ) covers two terms). 17
17 Note that (A,B0, ∗) and (A, ∗, Ct−2) are not a valid 1-block.
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Now, assign to the terms with an odd position in the list the weight 1, to the terms with an even position
in the list weight −1, and to all remaining terms in the term space the weight 0. It may be concluded
from the above that each block has weight 0, and hence each linear combination of blocks has weight 0
as well. Since the sum of the weights of all terms is non-zero (as the list is of odd length), the sum of all
terms cannot be spanned. 
We note that the lower bound of Claim C.1 is tight, since it matches the upper bound of Lemma 28.
Finally, combining the lower bound on ks provided by Claim C.1 with the exact characterization of kc in
Claim 23, we obtain the desired separation of ks from kc.
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